On February 22, 1994, F. Gregg Bemis, Jr. filed a Verified
Complaint against the Lusitania. Bemis claimed title by both conveyance and
salvage.
One interesting aspect of the case is the explanation of how
the interest in the Lusitania
itself came to be owned by Bemis. When
the Lusitania
was attacked and sunk on May 7, 1915, she was owned by Cunard Steamship
Co. Subsequent to the sinking, The
Liverpool and London War Risks Insurance Association Limited (Liverpool and London) paid a total loss claim to Cunard which resulted
in the rights and interest in the Lusitaina passing to Liverpool and London. Liverpool and London then sold the rights and interest in
the wreck to John F. Light by a letter dated March 2, 1967. John F. Light then entered into an agreement
with Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. on April 16, 1967, in which Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston advanced $136,785.47 to Light. This is called the “Photographic Agreement”
and provides, among other things “. . . the repayment of all moneys advanced to
Light or for his account shall be secured by a first lien and security interest
on, among other things, all his salvage and other proprietary rights in and to
the wreck of the Lusitania and all photographic, television, diving and marine
equipment and other tangible property acquired or used by him to conduct the
photographic operations and salvage operations.”
Light transferred 60% of his interest in the Lusitania to Macomber by
Bill of Sale dated January 10, 1968. Light
then transferred to Macomber another 6 2/3% interest in the wreck. These sales were subject to the lien secured
by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. Late in 1968, Macomber sold 50% of his
interest in the wreck to Bemis. That
same year, Light agreed to give Macomber and Bemis each the right to a 1/3
share of the proceeds and benefits of the Photographic Agreement. In consideration for this assignment,
Macomber paid Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. $136,785.47, the same amount Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc. had advanced to Light.
On June 4, 1971, Macomber requested Light execute and
deliver to an attorney in Cork, Ireland several mortgage documents, including
the document for the Lusitania. A few days later, Bemis demanded payment of
notes due. Both had the authority to
make these demands. The letters were
hand-delivered to Light at his residence in Kinsale, Ireland,
who failed to execute the mortgage documents.
Therefore, Light defaulted under the terms of the Photographic Agreement
and Macomber, as Holt, Rinehart and Winston’s assignee, became entitled to take
possession of the wreck of the Lusitania
in satisfaction of the debt.
Sometime during the mid-80s, Macomber withdrew from the
operation and assigned his entire right, title, and interest in the wreck of
the Lusitania
to Bemis. The court also noted that it
was significant that the widow of John Light, in reaching a settlement
agreement with Bemis, assigned all of her rights, title, and interest in the
wreck of the Lusitania to Bemis so that even if John Light had retained some
interest in the wreck, Bemis would now own such interest. The Court concluded that Bemis had
established an accurate and complete chain of title, but it remained unclear as
to what had exactly been conveyed. That
is, the Court found that Bemis owned title to the Lusitania’s “. . . hull, engines, tackle,
apparel and appurtenances.” The Court
must now decide whether the cargo and personal effects of the crew and
passengers are included in the claim.
The Court concluded that the cargo and personal effects of the crew and
passengers had not been conveyed by title.
With respect to any cargo and personal effects of the crew and
passengers that had already been salvaged from past expeditions, the Court
concluded that those items had been abandoned and, pursuant to the law of
finds, lawful title now vested in those who had salvaged them. The Court also concluded that Bemis had not
established any exclusive rights to the cargo or personal effects still
submerged pursuant to either the law of finds or salvage law and denied Bemis
claim to title to them based on conveyance or the law of finds. Finally, the Court denied his request for
either a salvage reward or injunctive relief.
Bemis appealed the decision to the United States Court
of Appeals, Fourth District, which affirmed the district court’s decision. Bemis then appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States
which declined to hear the case.
What follows is the complete text of the Opinions with the
copyrighted material (West headnotes) omitted.
884 F.Supp.
1042
United States District Court,
E.D. Virginia,
Norfolk Division.
.
F. Gregg BEMIS, Jr., Plaintiff,
v.
The RMS LUSITANIA, her engines, tackle,
apparel, appurtenances, cargo, etc., in rem, Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 2:94cv226. | April 18, 1995.
Plaintiff asserted claims for title, salvage and
injunctive relief with respect to the vessel Lusitania, which was sunk
by a torpedo during World War I. The District Court, Clarke, J., held that: (1) owner of the vessel did not
have title to the cargo and personal effects of passengers and crew,
and thus plaintiff did not obtain title to the cargo and personal effects
by conveyance from owner to insurer and then to himself; (2) decision
of English court did not establish title by conveyance to the cargo
and personal effects; (3) though plaintiff had title under the law of
finds to artifacts he had recovered, plaintiff did not demonstrate sufficient
possession over all the cargo and personal effects to vest title to
the cargo and personal effects remaining in the hull and on the ocean
floor; and (4) plaintiff did not establish possession, due diligence
and continuing salvage operations sufficient to establish exclusive
salvage rights.
Judgment accordingly.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*1044 Glen A. Huff, Richard T. Robol, Huff, Poole & Mahoney, Virginia Beach, VA,
for plaintiff.
Opinion CLARKE, District Judge.
On May 7,
1915 the luxury liner RMS LUSITANIA (“Lusitania”) was struck by
a single torpedo fired by a U–Boat of the German Imperial Navy. She
sank in less than 18 minutes, settling about 12 miles off the coast
of Ireland.
The Plaintiff,
F. Gregg Bemis, Jr. (“Bemis”), filed a Verified Complaint against
the vessel on February 22, 1994. In an Order issued May 24, 1994 this
Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to properly address Bemis'
claims for title, salvage, and injunctive relief based on conditions
set forth in that Order. Accordingly, the Court entered the Order for
a Warrant of Arrest.1
On July
30, 1994, Ms. Muriel Light, the widow of John Light, wrote a letter
to the Court. The contents of the letter disputed Bemis' Complaint and
the Court construed *1045 her letter as an Answer to the Complaint2. On September
7, 1994 Fifty Fathom Ventures, Inc. (“FFV”) lodged a Claim and Answer.
FFV sought a declaration of title and rights to the LUSITANIA. FFV based
its claim on a recreational diving expedition undertaken to the shipwreck
in June 1994. Argument with respect to FFV's claim was heard on November
9, 1994. In an Order dated November 10, 1994 the Court found that several
factual underpinnings remained unresolved and therefore, the Court decided
to re-examine the issue after a further hearing set for November 22,
1994. However, in a conference call on November 21, 1994, both parties
asked the Court to continue the hearing for ten (10) days. In an Order
dated November 22, 1994 the Court granted the combined motion and reset
the case for evidentiary hearing and argument on FFV's claim on all
issues including the issue of whether this Court has proper jurisdiction
over the Lusitania.
On December
7, 1994 the Court heard live testimony and arguments on the timeliness
of FFV's claim and ruling from the bench it denied FFV's Motion to File
a Late Claim. Further, on December 8, 1994 the Court, with FFV's participation,
heard evidence with respect to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.
In an Order dated January 6, 1995 this Court concluded that it was proper
for the Court to retain jurisdiction, consistent with the Court's earlier
Order dated May 24, 1994.
In addition,
on February 22, 1995, the Court entered an Order dismissing with prejudice
the claim of Mrs. Muriel Light, after Mrs. Light and Bemis represented
to the Court that all matters in controversy between the two parties
had been compromised and settled.
The Lusitania
was sunk on May 7, 1915 off the southern coast of Ireland. In May 1915
Cunard Steamship Co. (“Cunard”) owned the Lusitania. The Liverpool
and London War Risks Insurance Association Limited (“Liverpool and
London”) paid a total loss claim to Cunard and the rights and interest
in the vessel passed to Liverpool and London. By a letter dated March
2, 1967, Liverpool and London sold to John F. Light (“Light”) “the
rights and interest in the wreck of the LUSITANIA on the understanding
that it would not be salved as a whole, repaired and put into commission
again, and also that the purchaser takes over all liabilities and expenses
which might attach to the wreck.” Ex. 1.3
On April
16, 1967 Light entered into an agreement with Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
Inc. (“HRW”), known as the “Photographic Agreement”. Ex. 6.
HRW advanced $136,785.47 to Light under the Photographic Agreement. Id. The Photographic
Agreement provides:
the repayment
of all moneys advanced to Light or for his account shall be secured
by a first lien and security interest on, among other things, all his
salvage and other proprietary rights in and to the wreck of the Lusitania
and all photographic, television, diving and marine equipment and other
tangible property acquired or used by him to conduct the photographic
operations and salvage operations.
Id.
The Photographic
Agreement further requires Light at HRW's request to execute, acknowledge
and deliver any assignment, mortgage, financing statement or other instrument
or conveyance that HRW may request to secure and perfect HRW's rights
under or otherwise implement the provisions of the Photographic Agreement.
Further, it *1046 provides that in the event of Light's refusal
or failure to do so, HRW shall have full power and authority as attorney-in-fact
for Light to execute, acknowledge and deliver any such instrument or
conveyance. Ex. 6 at 15, ¶ 9.
By Bill
of Sale dated January 10, 1968 Light transferred sixty (60) percent
of his interest in the Lusitania to Macomber. Ex. 5. Shortly thereafter,
by Bill of Sale dated July 29, 1968, Light transferred to Macomber an
additional six and two-thirds percent interest in the vessel. Ex. 8.
The Bills of Sale were signed for Light by attorney F. William Andres
under a Power of Attorney. The Power of Attorney was executed on April
24, 1967 or 1968. Ex. 7.4 When looking
at the document the year is unclear: 1967 is typed in, however, an eight
is written in just above the typed year. None of the witnesses' addressed
this issue; however, the Court finds it ultimately immaterial. Macomber
testified that these transfers were in consideration of Macomber's refraining
from discontinuing to finance the project. The Sales were subject to
the lien secured by HRW.
Testimony
of both Bemis and Macomber indicate that in late 1968, Macomber sold
fifty (50) percent of his interest to Bemis. On April 12, 1968 Light
agreed to give Macomber and Bemis each the right to a one-third share
of the proceeds and benefits of the Photographic Agreement. Ex. 9.
By an agreement
made July 12, 1969 between HRW and Macomber, HRW with Light's consent,
assigned to Macomber, acting for himself and Bemis, HRW's entire right
to and interest in the Photographic Agreement. Therefore, Macomber and
Bemis acquired HRW's rights and interests in the Photographic Agreement.
In consideration for said assignment Macomber paid HRW $136,785.47.
Ex. 11.
On June
4, 1971 Macomber wrote a letter to Light requesting Light to execute
and deliver to attorney D.F. Williams of Cork, Ireland several mortgage
documents, including the document for the Lusitania. Exs. 12 & 13.
Macomber had the authority to demand this from Light pursuant to the
Photographic Agreement that Light entered into with HRW and which rights
in the Photographic Agreement HRW subsequently sold to Macomber. Ex.
6.
On June
7, 1971 Bemis wrote a similar letter demanding payment of notes due.
Ex. 14. Bemis had the same authority as Macomber to make such a demand
as outlined above.
Bemis and
Macomber testified that the letters were hand delivered to Light at
his residence in Kinsale, Ireland in June 1971. Further, they both testified
that Light never executed the mortgage documents nor responded to Macomber's
letter. Light defaulted under the terms of the Photographic Agreement.
Upon default, Macomber, as HRW's assignee, became entitled to take possession
of, and retain, the Lusitania in satisfaction of the debt.
At the March
17, 1995 hearing Macomber testified that in the mid–1980s he withdrew
from the operation and assigned his entire right, title and interest
in the Lusitania to Bemis. The conveyance was formalized in a letter
dated October 20, 1986, a letter dated September 24, 1990 and an instrument
dated July 21, 1993. Exs. 17–19.
Additionally
and significantly, on February 22, 1995, Mrs. Light and Bemis reached
a settlement agreement wherein Mrs. Light assigned all of her rights,
title and interest in the Lusitania, both individually and as Administratrix
of the Estate of John Light, to Bemis. Ex. 15. Thus, even if Light had
retained some interest in the Lusitania, Bemis now owns such interest.
The Court
finds that Bemis has established an accurate and complete chain of title.
However, what remains unclear is exactly what was conveyed. The Court
finds that the title indeed covers Lusitania's hull, engines, tackle,
apparel and appurtenances. The inquiry is whether the cargo and personal
effects of passengers and crew are included *1047 in this
claim. Bemis claims that, in addition to the hull, engines, tackle,
apparel and appurtenances, the chain of title also covers the cargo
and personal effects of everyone on board. Bemis testified that it was
his understanding that his former attorney, Mr. F. William Andres, believed
cargo and personal effects of those on board were included. Furthermore,
many of the above described documents include cargo in the description
of what was to be conveyed. In addition to his argument that the cargo
and personal effects of passengers and crew were directly conveyed in
the chain of title, Bemis argues that he has title to these items (in
addition to items directly owned by Cunard Lines) based on either recognition
and enforcement of a decision by the Queen's Bench Divisional Court
in England or abandonment. The Court will first address his direct conveyance
argument.
[1] To determine if the chain of title includes the
cargo and personal effects of passengers and crew, the Court must look
to the beginning of the chain. In May 1915 the Lusitania was owned by
Cunard, which had the vessel insured with Liverpool and London. After
the vessel was sunk, Liverpool and London paid a total loss claim to
Cunard and all rights and interests in the vessel passed to Liverpool
and London. So the question that must be addressed is whether Liverpool
and London acquired any interest in the cargo and personal effects when
it paid a total loss claim to Cunard.5
The Court
finds that Cunard did not and could not transfer rights in the cargo
or personal effects. The first piece of evidence regarding the title
is the letter Liverpool and London sent to Light on March 2, 1967. See Ex. 1.
The letter states in pertinent part:
“LUSITANIA”—SUNK
1915 This vessel was entered
in the Association in 1915 and was sunk on the 7th May, 1915, off the
Southern Coast of Ireland. Subsequently, the Association paid a total
loss claim to the Owners and the rights and interests in the vessel
passed to the Association. ... the Association has sold to you the rights
and interests in the wreck of the “Lusitania” on the understanding
that it will not be salved as a whole, repaired and put into commission
again, and also that the purchaser takes over all liabilities and expenses
which might attach to the wreck.
Id. This does not establish that the interest in
the cargo and personal effects of passengers and crew were included
in this assignment. In fact, literal reading of the letter of conveyance
dictates just the opposite. The Owner, Cunard, did not have any interest
in the cargo or the personal effects of passengers and crew and as such
could not pass those rights to Liverpool and London. Furthermore, the
plain language of the letter indicates that the rights and interests
in the vessel passed to the Liverpool and London Association, and cargo
and personal effects were not included.
Bemis argues
that on the face of its conveyance on March 2, 1967, it is clear that
Liverpool & London sold the rights to the “wreck” to Light and
that under established English law, the “wreck” includes all items
on the shipwreck, of whatever origin. See Kennedy, The Law
of Salvage § 188
(5th ed. 1985). However, the Court is not persuaded by this argument
as it is clear from the letter of conveyance that Liverpool & London
sold the rights to the vessel and not to the cargo and personal effects.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Liverpool and London paid a loss
for the cargo or personal effects of everyone on board from which to
become subrogated to or from which to claim a transfer of ownership
from cargo owners or passengers. While it is true that at one point
in the letter the term “wreck” was included, it is equally true
that the letter also said, “the rights and interests in the vessel passed
to the Association.” This would not pass title to the cargo or personal
effects. The Court is not persuaded that the original contract between
Cunard and Liverpool and London included the cargo or the personal effects
of passengers and crew. Therefore, Liverpool *1048 and London
never had title to such to convey to Light.
Bemis also
argues that the conveyance from Cunard to Liverpool and London included
the cargo and passenger items as it is confirmed by later conveyances
that expressly include the term “cargo” in the contract. Yet this
argument is not sound because if Cunard did not have any interest in
the cargo or personal effects then it is irrelevant what the others
thought they were conveying.
[2] Bemis argues that independently, Pierce and Another v. Bemis and Others: The Lusitania, 1 Q.B. 401 (1986) [hereinafter Queen's
Bench ], confirms Bemis' and Macomber's
title to cargo and passenger's personal effects. The Court does not
agree with this interpretation of the opinion. The English Court opinion
makes clear that it was stipulated among the parties that Bemis and
Macomber had legal title to the vessel, therefore, that was not an issue
before the English Court. What was at issue was whether the British
Crown was entitled to the artifacts that the claimants, including Bemis,
brought up from a 1982 diving expedition. The artifacts were items that
came from the cargo and the personal effects. The Court held that the
Crown did not have a valid claim to the title of the artifacts and therefore,
the claimants had better title than anyone else. It was on the basis
of possessory title, not title by conveyance, that the Queen's Bench
Divisional Court declared Bemis and the other claimants to be the owners
of the artifacts. As it turned out, the claimants, participants in the
1982 expedition, divided the artifacts amongst themselves.
This Court
does not contest or find anything in the present case inapposite from
the ruling by the Queen's Bench; in fact, the Court's ruling today is
entirely consistent with that from the Queen's Bench. First, the Court
notes that the parties involved in the English litigation did not agree
that Bemis had title by conveyance as to the cargo and personal effects.
Furthermore, the Queen's Bench found only that the Crown had no right
to the property as a droit of Admiralty and that as such no one else
had better right to the contents that Bemis and Macomber, as divers,
recovered from the wreck. Essentially, it awarded them possessory title.
There was no adjudication as to rights in future artifacts.6 While keeping
in perfect harmony with the English Court, this Court agrees that all
of the contents awarded to him during the English litigation are his.
Furthermore, the Court finds that based on the law of finds, as set
forth below, he has acquired title to the contents he brought up on
the 1993 and 1994 expeditions.
Finally, Bemis argues that based on abandonment, he is entitled the remaining cargo and personal effects. Before the Court determines whether Bemis is entitled to these contents, it must first determine the applicable law. Two legal theories of law may be applied to shipwrecked vessels: the law of finds and the law of salvage. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that both doctrines are applicable to the instant case and discusses each in turn.
[3] [4] [5] [6] The common law of finds, expresses “the ancient and honorable principle of ‘finders, keepers.’ ” Martha's Vineyard Scuba HQ v. Unidentified Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1065 (1st Cir.1987). Traditionally, the law of *1049 finds was applied only to maritime property which had never been owned by anybody. Yet recent trends suggest applying the law of finds when there has been a finding that the sunken property has been abandoned by its previous owners. E.g., Columbus–America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 464 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1000, 113 S.Ct. 1625, 123 L.Ed.2d 183 (1993); Moyer v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel known as the Andrea Doria, 836 F.Supp. 1099, 1104–05 [hereinafter Andrea Doria ]. The key to ownership is whether the owner has abandoned the property. Abandonment by the owner can be express or implied. Lapse of time and nonuse by the owner may give rise to an inference of an intent to abandon. Andrea Doria, 836 F.Supp. at 1105 (citing Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F.Supp. 452, 456 (E.D.Va.1960)). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has stated that abandonment can be inferred in the case of a historic shipwreck when no owners come forward during the action to claim ownership rights. Columbus–America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d at 461. In this case, no owners have come forward and the Verified Complaint was filed in February 1994. In addition, it has been almost eighty years since the sinking of the vessel. The Court finds that the cargo and the personal effects have been abandoned.7 Finding that the contents have been abandoned, the Court deems it appropriate to apply the law of finds to determine if title to the contents vests in Bemis. Pursuant the common law of finds, the ownership of abandoned property depends on the finder taking possession. “Title to abandoned property is acquired by the finder who demonstrates ‘occupancy’, which is defined as ‘taking possession of the property and exercising dominion or control over it.’ ” Andrea Doria, 836 F.Supp. at 1106 (citing Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 572 (5th Cir.1981) [hereinafter Treasure Salvors III ] ). Once the finder establishes possession, he holds title to the property which is good against all, including the original owner since abandonment forfeits all the owner's rights.8
Aside from the 1982 expedition, Bemis has only recovered one artifact from his expeditions: one spoon from the cargo. The Court finds that the title to the one spoon from the cargo that Bemis brought into this district from his 1993 expedition belongs to Bemis pursuant to the law of finds. Bemis testified on April 26, 1994 that they gathered that one artifact from the 1993 expedition. He was in a submarine down on the bottom of the ocean floor, he spotted a spoon amongst the wreckage and used the submarine's grasping mechanism to secure it.9 On March 17, 1995 *1050 Bemis testified that he recently learned that the spoon recovered from the 1993 expedition originated from the cargo. After making the determination that the cargo has been abandoned by the previous owners, the Court finds that title in the spoon vests in Bemis.
[7] [8] The question that remains is whether Bemis can
be awarded title, under the law of finds, to all the cargo and personal
effects still on the ocean floor and within the hull. The Court, as
stated above, finds that the contents have indeed been abandoned. And
as stated by Judge Walter E. Hoffman:
Holding
that the vessel and its cargo have long since been voluntarily abandoned,
the following rule applies: “Personalty, on being abandoned, ceases
to be the property of any person, and thenceforth is no man's property,
unless and until it is reduced to possession with intent to acquire
title to, or ownership of, it. It may, accordingly, be appropriated
by anyone, if it has not been reclaimed by the former owner, and appropriating
it and reducing it to possession with intention to become its owner,
provided, it has been said, the taking is fair.
Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F.Supp. at 456. The first person to reduce such property to
possession, either actual or constructive, becomes its owner. R. Brown, The Law of Personal Property 15 (2d
ed. 1955). The early American case of Eads v.
Brazelton suggests
that if a salvor keeps a ship over the wreck and carries on a continual
salvage operation, the salvor establishes possession of all the contents. Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499, 511 (1861).
In a more
recent case, the Southern District of New York found that the law of
finds precluded an award of property when the parties have not located
the contents, let alone possessed or controlled them. Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 355 (S.D.N.Y.1981). In reaching this conclusion the Hener Court noted
that in cases where courts awarded title to and an exclusive right to
recover the entire cargo, the parties had recovered a large part of
the cargo. See id. (citing Treasure Salvors Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 546 F.Supp. 919 (S.D.Fla.1981)). In precluding the award of property, the Hener Court noted
that in the Treasure
Salvors case the
party involved had recovered much of the cargo and had placed the rest
within its possession to the extent consistent with the nature of the
cargo, and that the party was “engaged in systematic, unrelenting
work to recover all the remaining cargo from the entire area over which
it was scattered”. Hener, 525 F.Supp. at 355.
“To justify
an award of title (albeit of one that is defeasible), the law of finds
requires a finder to demonstrate not only the intent to acquire the
property involved, but also possession of that property, that is, a
high degree of control over it.” Id. at 356.
In Paragraph
11 of his Verified Complaint, Bemis contends that he “has located
the shipwreck and has and is actively and successfully engaged in possession
and dominion, as well as conditions and circumstances permit, and has
the current ability to continue such.” However, this Court is not
persuaded that with regards to the submerged cargo and personal effects
Bemis has demonstrated possession or the degree of control necessary
to vest title under the law of finds. While there is nothing in the
record to clearly indicate exactly what artifacts from the 1982 expedition
are part of the cargo, Bemis did testify on March 17, 1995 that he recently
learned that the one spoon recovered during the 1993 expedition actually
came from the cargo.
[9] [10] [11] [12] In the alternative, Bemis argues that he is entitled
to a liberal salvage award and injunctive relief so that he may have
the sole right to continue salvage operations. Three elements must be
established in order to assert a salvage claim. First, the property
rescued must be in marine peril. Courts will usually find that underwater
shipwrecks are in marine peril, because sunken vessels and their cargoes
are in danger of being lost forever. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified
Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 336–37 (5th Cir.1978). Next,
the salvage service must be voluntary. Finally, the salvage must be
successful, in whole or in part. The salvor can receive a salvage award
only through actual recovery of the property. Although the law of salvage,
like the law of finds, requires a salvor to establish possession over
property before obtaining the right to exclude others, “possession”
means something less in salvage law than in finds law. Hener, 525 F.Supp. at 357. In the
salvage context, only the right to compensation for service, not the
right to title, usually results; “possession” is therefore more
readily found than under the law of finds. Id. Furthermore, the possession need not be continuous,
but only as such the “nature and situation” of the salvage operations
permit. Id. at 354 (quoting Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. at 511). Generally,
the Court will grant an exclusive right to salvage if the salvor's effort
is ongoing and there is likelihood of success.
As a substitute
for possession, one Court has focused on whether the salvor's efforts
were taken with due diligence. See, Andrea Doria, 836 F.Supp. at 1107. If due
diligence is demonstrated, then the Court next determines whether the
operations are ongoing. “This inquiry has a slightly different focus
than the due diligence inquiry: the evaluation looks not only to the
salvor's past efforts, but also his present intentions.” Id.; see Treasure Salvors III, 640 F.2d at 567. (“so
long as the original salvors appear ready, willing and able to complete
the salvage project.”) The Andrea Doria Court found that the salvor's efforts were on-going
when adverse sea and weather conditions prevented him from continuing
salvage operations during the summer in question. The Court looked to
his future plans and found that based on the salvor's intention to continue
his search the following summer he had demonstrated that his efforts
were sufficiently “ongoing” to support the issuance of an injunction
to secure those efforts.
[13] However, even following the most relaxed standard
for establishing possession, due diligence or continuing salvaging operations,
the Court is still not persuaded that Bemis has demonstrated the requisite
amount of possession over the contents to qualify for the exclusive
right to salvage in the future. In the present case, the Court is not
convinced that Bemis has met any of these standards. Rather, the Court
finds that Bemis does not meet the requisite “possession” requirements,
has not conducted ongoing salvage operations and has not shown a fair
chance at success in the future.
To support
this finding, the Court notes that in the past 13 years Bemis has participated
in only three expeditions to the shipwreck. The first expedition was
in 1982 and a crew of divers, at Bemis' direction, recovered approximately
94 artifacts. The next expedition did not occur until 11 years later
when in 1993 Bemis entered into a cooperative agreement with the National
Geographic Society and Dr. Robert Ballard10. The trip
also included historians, artists, ship engineers, photographers, and
sonar imaging experts. As set forth more fully below, although Bemis
was present for the expedition, he did not substantially contribute
to the operation. In fact, the Court notes that he was paid for the
effort. In the words of Dr. Ballard, when asked if Bemis played a cooperative *1052 role in
the 1993 expedition, “Yes, in that he did not obstruct or in any way
try to affect or alter our operational plan that we had submitted to
him....”
The most
recent expedition, during the summer of 1994, fell far short of its
expected success. Before the expedition, Bemis testified that it was
to be a two week expedition to “accumulate additional scientific and
historic data about the shipwreck,” and selectively gather additional
artifacts to include in a travelling Lusitania museum. Aff. of Bemis,
at 2. However, as Bemis himself testified, the plans were truncated.
A supplier of some necessary equipment pulled back, leaving Bemis with
only enough equipment for four divers. The expedition only lasted two
days after a diving accident severely injured one of the divers. No
artifacts were recovered, although Bemis did place a commemorative placque
on the side of the ship. Therefore, the Court concludes that Bemis is
not in “possession” of the contents for purposes of pursuing exclusive
salvage rights.
Furthermore,
the Court finds that Bemis is not participating in ongoing salvage operations
nor has he shown a fair chance of future successful salvage. Bemis has
submitted de bene
esse depositions to support his
position that he is capable of performing successful salvage operations
in the future and that future salvage expeditions would have a positive
role in contributing to the historic and scientific understanding of
the shipwreck. The Court does not find these persuasive in light of
all events as they have unfolded.
First, Bemis
introduced the deposition of Dr. Robert Ballard. As stated above, Dr.
Ballard is the Director of the Center for Marine Exploration at the
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. Ballard states that he sought out
Bemis in 1991 when the National Geographic Society was interested in
an expedition to explore the Lusitania. Ballard and Bemis reached an
agreement that resulted in the 1993 expedition. The expedition sought
to explore the shipwreck, and the purpose as set forth in paragraph
one of the agreement was clearly protecting the scientific, historical
and educational values. Ballard stated that Bemis played a cooperative
role and that he came out to the exploration site almost every day.
However, as noted above, Ballard also testified that Bemis' contribution
was that he did not change the plans and arrangements as proposed by
Ballard. Nothing in the record indicates that Bemis did any independent
research. As such, the Court finds that Bemis did not have a significant
role in the 1993 expedition. Furthermore, only one spoon was salvaged
throughout the entire expedition.11 Ballard
also testified that future expeditions would have a positive role in
contributing to the historic and scientific understanding of the shipwreck
and that Bemis' ownership has played a positive role in protecting the
ship. This last statement of Ballard, that Bemis' ownership has played
a positive role in protecting the ship, appears to the Court to be conclusory
and without any factual support. The Court does not attach any significance
to it when passing on the issue of whether Bemis has been conducting
ongoing salvage operations.12
Bemis also
presented the deposition of Louis L. Tapscott, the Senior Vice President
of Sonsub, Inc. Mr. Tapscott has over thirty-five years of executive,
management and operating experience in the subsea industry. *1053 The essence
of Tapscott's testimony was that based on his expertise and familiarity
with Bemis, he feels Bemis understands the financing and legal sides
of salvage projects as well as the diving area. Tapscott asserts that
Bemis is very capable with respect to the management, financing, technology
and operations as to the Lusitania shipwreck and is totally competent
to conduct future salvage operations on the wreck.
The Court
finds that Tapscott's statements are conclusory and furnish no factual
background for the conclusions. Therefore, the Court gives little weight
to Tapscott's deposition. Furthermore, even if the Court assumed Tapscott
had the necessary factual background to make such an assessment, the
Court is of the opinion that his testimony fails to show that Bemis
has been conducting ongoing salvage operations or was otherwise exercising
any control over the Lusitania.
Finally,
Bemis submitted the deposition of Mr. Les Joiner, President of The Ocean
Corporation. Mr. Joiner has been involved with Bemis and working on
the logistics of trying to put together a future expedition on the Lusitania.
Joiner states that Bemis is very capable of management, financing, technology
and operation of projects to recover the Lusitania shipwreck. Furthermore,
he believes that Bemis is capable of future recovery efforts with respect
to the Lusitania at any time, provided the vessel, manpower and weather
window are favorable. While Joiner expresses his opinion concerning
Bemis' capabilities, he also fails to give a factual background for
that opinion.
In conclusion,
the Court finds that Bemis has not demonstrated possession of the cargo
or personal effects nor has he engaged in the sustained salvage operations
which would justify a grant of exclusive salvage rights. While he has
submitted evidence that he may be in the position to conduct future
operations, the Court is not persuaded that such a claim currently entitles
him to exclusive salvage rights. Therefore, this Court denies his request
for exclusive salvage rights to the cargo and personal effects.
[14] Furthermore, the Court denies his request for
a salvage award. Pursuant to the law of finds, Bemis has been allowed
to keep all of the contents that he has salvaged; therefore, an award
is not appropriate.
The Court
concludes that Bemis has established an accurate and complete chain
of title to the vessel, her hull, tackle and appurtenances. However,
the cargo and personal effects of passengers and crew have not been
conveyed by title.
With respect
to the cargo and personal effects of passengers and crew that have been
salvaged from past expeditions, the Court concludes that those items
had been abandoned and that pursuant to the law of finds lawful title
to such contents now vests with those who salvaged them. The Court distinguishes
the already salvaged cargo and personal effects from the cargo and personal
effects still remaining submerged. The Court concludes that Bemis has
not established any exclusive rights to the cargo and personal effects
submerged pursuant to either the law of finds or salvage law. Therefore,
the Court denies Bemis claim to title to the still submerged cargo and
personal effects of the passengers and crew based on conveyance or the
law of finds. Furthermore, it denies his request for either a salvage
reward or injunctive relief.
Additionally,
the artifacts having been a part of the vessel itself that were the
basis of FFV's claim throughout the November and *1054 December
hearings also belong to Bemis based on the above demonstrated chain
of title by conveyance. The United States Marshal Service is directed
to deliver said artifacts to Bemis' counsel for delivery to Bemis.
IT IS SO
ORDERED.
1995 A.M.C.
1665
Footnotes
| |
The Court also cautioned
Bemis that he was to comply promptly and fully with all directions and
conditions stated in the Order and that failure to do so would cause
the Court to re-evaluate its exercise of jurisdiction in this matter.
| |
The Court found that Ms.
Light filed the Answer both in her individual capacity and in her capacity
as the Administratrix of her husband's estate.
| |
The Exhibit numbers refer
to the hearing on March 17, 1995 unless otherwise specified.
| |
The document was identified
and authenticated by the de bene esse deposition of attorney C. Thomas Swaim. Mr. Swaim
was an associate working directly under Mr. Andres and he was a witness
to the execution of this document.
| |
The Court notes that Bemis
did not present any evidence covering the insurance contract between
Cunard and Liverpool and London. Therefore, the Court looks to the letter
sent by Liverpool and London to Light on March 2, 1967 in an effort
to determine the scope of insurance coverage.
| |
If there had been, Bemis
would not need to be in this Court.
| |
The Court notes that this
finding is in complete harmony with the Queen's Bench decision. “So
far as the owners of the contents are concerned, it is a necessary inference
from the agreed facts and from the lapse of 67 years before any attempt
was made to salve the contents that the owners of the contents abandoned
their property.” Queen's Bench at 6.
| |
Two exceptions to the rule
are recognized: First, when the abandoned property is embedded in the
soil, it belongs to the owner of the soil; Second, when the owner of
the land where the property is found (whether on or embedded in the
soil) has constructive possession of the property such that the property
is not “lost,” it belongs to the owner of the land. Klein v. Wrecked and Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir.1985) (citations
omitted). The Court finds neither exception applicable to the instant
case. There has been no evidence that any of the cargo or the personal
effects are embedded in the soil. Further, there is nothing in the record
to indicate that the Republic of Ireland has exercised constructive
possession of the property such that the property is not “lost”.
While there is evidence in the record that the Office of Public Works
for the Republic of Ireland has recently issued an Underwater Heritage
Order, there was no such order at the time Bemis made his expeditions
or asserted his claim. The order would prevent any further diving on
the wreck without prior authority from the Irish government.
Furthermore,
the Court notes that the contents that were the subject of the English
Court decision are not in issue in this case and that title in those
objects indisputably rests with Bemis and the other claimants in accordance
with their informal agreement.
| |
In later hearings, Bemis
testified that no artifacts were recovered during the 1994 expedition.
| |
Dr. Ballard is Senior Scientist
and Director of the Center for marine Exploration at the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute. Dr. Ballard's experience includes exploration
of historic shipwrecks, such as the Titanic,
Bismark, Isis and Lusitania.
| |
The Court does note that
in addition to the spoon, the expedition also produced valuable information
about the vessel. As Ballard testified, “this was the most thorough
and scientific expedition ever carried out on the Lusitania. All previous
expeditions were very cursory in nature, many of which were carried
out for salvage purposes and not for scientific inquiry.” Ballard
Dep. at 18–19. While this testimony has value in assessing the dominion
and control Bemis is attempting to exercise over the Lusitania such
value is minimal considering Bemis' lack of actual planning and organization
of the 1993 expedition.
| |
The Court realizes that “ongoing
operations” also includes plans for the future; however, the Court
is not persuaded that Bemis has demonstrated the requisite amount of
possession over the submerged cargo. Therefore, the Court evaluates
the testimony concerning future operations in light of the past attempts
in order to determine if the salvage operations can be deemed “ongoing”.
In the instant case, the Court finds that Bemis' efforts do not establish
an “ongoing” salvage operation.
END OF DOCUMENT
| |
Unpublished Disposition
99 F.3d 1129
NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
(The Court's decision is referenced in a “Table
of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter.
See CTA4 Rule 32.1.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
F. Gregg BEMIS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE RMS Lusitania, her engines, tackle,
apparel, appurtenances, cargo, etc., in rem, Defendant-Appellee,
and
Muriel C. LIGHT; Fifty Fathom Ventures,
Incorporated, Claimants.
No. 95-2057. | Decided Sept. 17, 1996. | Submitted
Aug. 30, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. J. Calvitt Clarke, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CA-94-226)
AFFIRMED.
Richard T. Robol, HUFF, POOLE & MAHONEY, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
*1 F. Gregg Bemis, Jr., filed
this in rem action seeking a declaration that he is the sole owner of the wreck
of the RMS Lusitania. The district court determined that Bemis is indeed
the owner of the ship's hull, tackle, engines, and appurtenances, but
declined to award him ownership or a salvage award for the contents
of the ship, including the cargo and the passengers' possessions. Finding
no error in the district court's decision, we affirm.
I
The hull
of the Lusitania rests on the ocean floor off the coast of Ireland,
where it was sunk by a torpedo fired by a German Imperial Navy U-Boat
in 1915. The wreck is below 295 feet of water, in an area with a strong
current and low visibility, making efforts to salvage the contents of
the ship extremely difficult.
First, Bemis
contends that Cunard transferred the cargo and passengers' personal
effects to Liverpool, who paid the insurance carrier when the ship sank,
and that his entitlement to the contents followed the chain of title
to the ship.2 Although
the district court agreed that Bemis had title to the ship, it rejected
his claim to the contents on the chain-of-title argument.
Bemis presented
no direct evidence regarding the transfer from Cunard to Liverpool.
If Liverpool paid Cunard, the passengers, and the cargo owners for the
contents of the ship, the possessions and cargo would have been Liverpool's
to transfer to Light, and Light's to transfer to Macomber and Bemis. Columbus-America Discovery Group,
Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 457 (4th Cir.1992) (CADG I), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1000 (1993). However, the record contains no evidence that
such claims were actually paid by Liverpool.
Bemis contends
that William Andres, the attorney who handled the conveyance from Liverpool
to Light, and the later conveyance from Light to Macomber and Bemis,
believed that title to the contents of the ship were part of the conveyance.
Bemis offered his own statements, Macomber's testimony, and the statements
of Andres's former associate, Thomas Swain, regarding their understanding
of the title transfer.
[T]he Association
[Liverpool] paid a total loss claim to the Owners and the rights and
interests in the vessel passed to the Association.
...
[T]he Association
has sold to you the rights and interests in the wreck of the “Lusitania”
on the understanding that it will not be salved as a whole, repaired
and put into commission again, and also that the purchaser takes over
all liabilities and expenses which might attach to the wreck.
Bemis places
great weight on the use of the term “wreck” in the Liverpool letter
because, under English law, a wreck includes both the hull of a sunken
ship and its contents. John A. Edington, 3A Benedict
on Admiralty § 133
(7th ed. 1993 & Supp.1996). The district court, however, found that
the use of the term wreck was not dispositive, and that the word “vessel”
in the conveyance language was determinative; a “vessel” is, in
English law, the hull of a sunken ship, excluding its contents. See generally 3A Benedict on Admiralty §§ 205-09.
Both interpretations
of the letter are reasonable. However, in the absence of evidence about
Liverpool's agreement with Cunard, the district court did not err in
concluding that Liverpool transferred only the hull, tackle, and appurtenances
of the ship to Light.
III
Bemis next
asserts that the decision in Pierce v.
Bemis: The Lusitania, 1 Q.B.
401 (1986), confirms his title to the contents. The issue in Pierce was whether
the British Crown was entitled to artifacts that Bemis and other claimants
brought up in a 1982 diving expedition. The court concluded that Bemis
and his then-partners had title to the hull, and that the Crown did
not have title to the contents of the ship. Further, the court held
that Bemis was the owner of the salvaged artifacts by virtue of possessory
title. The English court did not, however, determine ownership of the
contents that were still on board the ship. As the district court recognized,
the English court's decision was not dispositive as to the title of
the contents still on board the ship. Further, the district court properly
concluded, under the same reasoning as that in the Pierce decision, that Bemis was the owner of the artifacts
recovered in the 1993 and 1994 dives.
Bemis only
has a claim on the contents still on board the ship if he can establish
that the contents were abandoned and he is entitled to relief through
the law of finds or the law of salvage. The law of finds expresses “the
ancient and honorable principle of'finders, keepers.' ” Martha's Vineyard Scuba HQ, Inc.
v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1065 (1st Cir.1987). It applies
to findings of sunken property abandoned by prior owners. CADG I, 974 F.2d at 464. A vessel
may be considered abandoned if no owner comes forward to claim it during
an action to claim ownership rights. Id. at 461. However, some overt act expressing an intent
to abandon is also required. Id. A person can be deemed the owner of abandoned
property if he takes possession of it and exercises dominion or control
over it. Moyer v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Known as Andrea Doria, 836 F.Supp. 1099, 1106 (D.N.J.1993). The mere discovery of an abandoned vessel is
not sufficient to establish possession. Id.
*3 The district court found that the contents of
the Lusitania were abandoned because no one, including the Lusitania's
passengers or their descendants, has come forward to file a claim since
Bemis commenced this action. CADG I, 974 F.2d at 465. However,
the court found that Bemis has only taken possession of the items he
salvaged from the ship during his past diving expeditions.
Bemis does
not have dominion and control over the remaining contents of the ship
because they are still submerged in the hull at the bottom of the ocean,
and he does not have a “ ‘high degree of control’ ” over the
contents. CADG I, 974 F.2d at 460 (quoting Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 356 (S.D.N.Y.1981)). Further, he is not conducting an ongoing salvage
operation, another ground for determining that a salvor has dominion
and control over cargo of a shipwreck. Hener, 525 F.Supp. at 355; Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified
Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 546 F.Supp. 919, 926 (S.D.Fl.1981); Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499, 511 (1861). A salvor does not obtain title simply by discovery
of lost or abandoned property; transitory presence is not sufficient
to establish control. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 571 (5th Cir.1981) (citing Brady v. S.S. African Queen, 179 F.Supp. 321 (E.D.Va.1960)).
Bemis also
sought a liberal salvage award and an injunction permitting him the
sole right to conduct salvage operations. A salvor is entitled to compensation
for recovery of the property; he is not generally awarded title to the
property. CADG I, 974 F.2d at 459.
To obtain
a salvage award, a claimant must establish three elements. First, the
property must be in marine peril; underwater shipwrecks are usually
considered in marine peril because of the risk of loss. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified
Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 336-37 (5th Cir.1978); 3A Benedict on Admiralty § 63.
Next, the salvage service must be voluntary. 3A Benedict
on Admiralty §§ 15,
23, 68. Third, the salvage must be successful, in whole or in part. Id. at § 88.
In addition, a salvor must establish possession of the property. Hener, 525 F.Supp. at 357. In the
alternative, the salvor must show that he has acted with due diligence
and that his salvage operations are ongoing. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified
Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d at 567; Andrea Doria, 836 F.Supp. at 1107. A salvor
“ ‘must have the intention and capacity to save the property involved,
but the [salvor] need not have the intention to acquire it.’ ” CADG I, 974 F.2d at 460 (quoting Hener, 525 F.Supp. at 357-58).
*4 The district court correctly found that Bemis
was not entitled to a salvage award. Although the contents of the Lusitania
are in marine peril and Bemis is performing salvage operations voluntarily,
the court concluded that Bemis had not had enough success to warrant
a salvage award. “ ‘It is not what salvors offer or attempt to do
that entitles them to compensation, but what they succeed in doing to
the benefit of the property.’ ” 3A Benedict
on Admiralty § 89 (quoting Curry v. The Loch Goil, 6 F. Cas. 995 (S.D.Fl.1877) (No. 3495)).
Bemis has expended significant resources in his attempts to salvage
the Lusitania's cargo; however, he has retrieved very few artifacts
from the shipwreck.
Further,
Bemis's three expeditions over thirteen years did not constitute due
diligence. Although Bemis recovered many artifacts in his 1982 dive,
the 1993 dive was run primarily by the National Geographic Society as
a photographic expedition. The 1994 dive was unsuccessful; the expedition
lasted only two days instead of the planned two weeks, and no artifacts
were recovered. These facts fully support the district court's conclusion
that Bemis does not have an “ongoing” operation, and that his chance
of future success is slim.
Bemis contends
finally that he should be given a salvage award and an injunction preventing
other divers from taking artifacts from the ship because of the scientific,
historical, and archaeological significance of the wreck.5 See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 546 F.Supp. at 927-28. The historical,
scientific, and archeological value of a shipwreck is a “significant
element” in the district court's consideration of a claim for an exclusive
salvage award. CADG I, 974 F.2d at 468 n. 9. As the
district court recognized, Bemis has conducted several expeditions to
the ship. However, his expeditions have been sporadic and not highly
successful.6 “It matters
not how arduously or skillfully the salvors may have labored ... salvage
remuneration is dependant upon the property's being saved.” 3A Benedict on Admiralty § 88.
Because Bemis has not participated in sustained, successful salvage
operations, the court properly found that an exclusive salvage award
was not warranted.
Most troubling
is Bemis's contention that “rogue” divers are exploring the shipwreck
and taking artifacts to which they are not entitled. One group of divers,
known as Fifty Fathoms Ventures, took several items from the wreck;
upon the district court's order, these items have been turned over to
Bemis, who now has title to them.
Another
group of divers, led by British diver Polly Tapson, planned a 1994 dive
to the wreck.7 Bemis submitted
as evidence a letter from Tapson to the other divers in her group, stating
that their dive would have to be surreptitious because Bemis had not
approved it. She referred to the divers' being able to “send [ ] up
anything we want to from the Lusitania,” and said that “[t]he Irish
we met seemed a bit funny about us taking anything from the wreck,”
but would “turn a blind eye rather than risk losing the [group's]
charter.” She also said that the group's “wreck robbing instincts
might have to be a tiny bit restrained.” Bemis contends, perhaps correctly,
that unless he is awarded an injunction, other divers will take artifacts
from the ship. Although the loss of artifacts would be unfortunate,
Bemis simply has no right to the injunction absent an ownership interest
in the contents of the ship, and he has not established such an interest.
Consequently, we find that the district court did not err in declining
to issue an injunction.
AFFIRMED
1996 WL
525417 (C.A.4 (Va.))
Footnotes
| |
Bemis was one of three private
owners of the Lusitania. One of the other owners, George Macomber, transferred
all of his interest in the ship to Bemis over the course of several
years, with the final conveyance in 1993. The other private owner, John
Light, is deceased. His widow, Muriel Light, opposed Bemis's claim in
the district court, but Bemis and Mrs. Light reached a settlement agreement
in 1995, whereby she assigned all of her interest in the ship to Bemis.
| |
Bemis also contended that
he obtained title to the contents through later conveyances. However,
as the district court noted, if Cunard did not convey title to the contents
to Liverpool, no later conveyance could have carried title to the contents.
| |
The 1993 dive was primarily
for the purpose of researching an article for National
Geographic magazine.
Bemis's cooperation with the author of the article, Dr. Robert Ballard,
was conditioned in part on his ability to accompany Ballard on the trip.
According to Ballard, Bemis was cooperative in the 1993 expedition “in
that he did not obstruct or in any way try to affect or alter our operational
plan that we had submitted to him.”
| |
Bemis contends that the district
court should have considered the expeditions of Macomber, Light, and
others even though Bemis did not personally participate in those operations.
Bemis is correct in stating that he need not personally participate
in salvage operations for those operations to be attributed to him.
He contends that Light and Macomber transferred to him any rights they
acquired as a result of their salvage operations in the 1960s and 1970s.
However, as the district court noted, Bemis has conducted only three
expeditions since 1982. Even if Light and Macomber's actions somehow
vested in Bemis, the district court could fairly have concluded that
Bemis's relative inaction over the past 14 years was determinative.
| |
Bemis's argument in this
regard is somewhat disingenuous. He relies largely on the deposition
testimony of Dr. Robert Ballard, an oceanographer with whom he travelled
to the Lusitania in 1993. Dr. Ballard stated that he is “opposed to
the recovery of artifacts” from historic shipwrecks. However, Bemis
testified that he wishes to bring artifacts up from the wreck to create
a travelling exhibition for museums.
| |
As the district court noted,
much of the photography and research which resulted in the National Geographic article
is attributable to Dr. Ballard, not to Bemis.
| |
The record does not clearly
reflect whether the dive actually took place.
END OF DOCUMENT
118 S.Ct.
1558
Supreme Court of the United States
F. Gregg BEMIS, Jr., petitioner,
v.
The RMS LUSITANIA, etc.
No. 96-1448. | April 27, 1998.
Case below, 884 F.Supp. 1042; 99 F.3d 1129.
*1559 Petition for writ of certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
118 S.Ct. 1558 (Mem), 140 L.Ed.2d
791, 65 USLW 3648
END OF DOCUMENT
| |
